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Promoting productivity in the National Health Service (England and 
Wales), 1950 to 1966.  
This article examines how and why productive efficiency in the National Health 
Services was promoted by government and by actors outside government between the early 
1950s and the mid-1960s. The Ministry of Health implemented some efficiency-related 
measures in the early part of this period, but these were cautious in scale. This was a matter of 
concern to various individuals and organisations outside government. These did what they 
could to encourage productivity in the NHS, mostly through investigations and advocacy. 
Hospital productivity became more politically salient after the publication of the report of the 
Committee of Enquiry into the Cost of the National Health Service in January 1956 (the 
‘Guillebaud’ committee). In its terms of reference, the committee had been asked to make 
recommendations on making more efficient use of public funds. Its report gave examples of 
how capital investment could reduce hospital running costs, but was otherwise more focused 
on cost than efficiency. The Treasury continued to resist calls for increased investment after 
Guillebaud on the grounds that the Ministry of Health was not doing enough to achieve 
economies and efficiencies in current spending.  The Ministry responded in 1958 with the 
announcement of new initiatives to build NHS capacity for productivity. These included the 
establishment of an advisory body, which came into being a year later as the NHS Advisory 
Council for Management Efficiency (England and Wales). The Advisory Council was 
dissolved in 1966 because, by this time, productivity specialists had been trained and recruited 
in the NHS and the Ministry had created a branch with responsibilities for hospital efficiency. 
After a preliminary definition of economic terms, the article begins with a discussion 
of the politics of NHS investment between Guillebaud and the Hospital Plan. This is a subject 
that has previously been treated in considerable depth by a number of authors, whose findings 
are briefly reviewed. The article considers some early responses to the cause of NHS 
productivity, coming from both inside and outside government. The implementation and 
subsequent development of the three initiatives announced in 1958 is then examined in some 
detail and with reference to archival sources. These initiatives have not previously been 
documented in any detail and are interesting in their own right as an aspect of NHS history. 
Beyond this, the history of NHS productivity policy speaks to a number of wider themes in the 
historiography of post-war Britain.  
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First, it connects the history of the NHS to that of industrial policy. Within the 
historiography of the latter, the core texts on productivity policy between 1945 and 1964 are 
by Tiratsoo and Tomlinson.1 Their work is concerned primarily with public policy and the 
limits of state intervention. In their first volume, they document the immediate post-war push 
for improved productivity. This was central to the Labour government’s economic policy and 
the focus of the USA’s programme of technical assistance to Britain. In the second, they show 
how government’s commitment to productivity, and to an active industrial policy more 
generally, attenuated under Conservative governments between 1951 and 1964. In addition to 
policy, and the development of institutions for productivity, the work of these authors deals 
with ideology, using language like ‘the productivity gospel’ and ‘productivity missionaries’ to 
capture the fervour of the champions of productivity. The productivity quest is presented as a 
social movement, challenging the complacency of British industrial management - and 
ultimately constrained by that complacency.2 Tiratsoo and Tomlinson’s writing extends to the 
public sector when it touches on the nationalised industries, but it does not consider the 
possibility that the productivity missionaries may have taken their gospel to the social 
services. This article shows that this did happen, at least in the case of health, and thereby 
extends our understanding of the productivity movement. 
Making the connection between these two previously separate literatures likewise 
extends our understanding of the history of NHS management. Much of the relevant literature 
argues that ‘administration’ rather than ‘management’ was the dominant paradigm before the 
early 1980s, providing continuity with health services before the NHS.3 In this interpretation, 
the Griffiths Report of 1983 is seen as the pivotal event, dismantling the myth that NHS 
administration was sui generis and had nothing to learn from the private sector. 4 Snow has 
provided a more nuanced version of this history, showing how management training was 
developed in the early NHS and how this encouraged the development of a new consciousness 
among hospital administrators. She is cautious in making any claims about how widely such 
developments permeated the service.5 The new public management (NPM) movement has 
sought to divide the history of public services into a pre-NPM era of bureaucracy and an era of 
management-led reform, starting around 1980. Cutler has challenged this interpretation, using 
‘performance management’ in NHS hospitals before 1962 as a case study.6  Robson identifies 
significant programmes of accounting and management reform between 1959 and 1974, 
including the introduction of ‘efficiency tools’.7 However, both these articles also identify 
significant limitations to management action in the early NHS. A picture emerges in which 
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some aspects of modern management practice appear to be present while others seem 
altogether absent. The precise contribution of managers as actors for improvement in the 
‘heyday of technocratic politics in the NHS’ remains strangely opaque.8 The history of NHS 
productivity, which relied upon the introduction of new management competencies and 
techniques, illuminate the nature and role of NHS management in this early period.  
As a third point of connection with the wider historiography, the material in this article 
also speaks to writing about the role of non-government organisations and the ‘moving 
frontier’ between the state and civil society in post-war Britain. Finlayson borrows this term 
from Beveridge in an article on the changing role of voluntarism in the first half of the 
twentieth century.9 He argues that a simple linear narrative, in which the state has expanded to 
fill gaps created by the insufficiency of voluntary action, is too simplistic. Instead, he sees 
historical processes in which the frontiers between public, private, voluntary and informal 
sectors are constantly in flux. This frame of reference seems helpful for the interpretation of 
the history of NHS productivity because the non-government actors involved were not all 
‘voluntary organisations’ by any of the many possible definitions of that term.10 Other actors, 
such as professional bodies and management consultants, were also involved. Two charitable 
foundations, the King’s Edwards Hospital Fund and the Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust, 
were members of the alliance. Both were concerned with the development and application of 
expertise in the health service. Both were also elitist, endowed organisations that did not need 
or seek mass-membership and so do not conform well to recent interpretations of the ‘politics 
of expertise’ in post-war Britain. 11 These preliminary considerations suggest that the history 
of NHS productivity offers a potentially rich case study of the moving frontier. 
In summary, then, the material presented in this article speaks to three questions. The 
first asks what the history of NHS productivity initiatives might add to our understanding of 
public policy for productivity from the early 1950s through to the mid-1960s. The second, 
what this material contributes to our historical understanding of the nature of management in 
the NHS during this period. The third asks what this material adds to our understanding of the 
development of the British state and of the ‘moving frontier’ between civil society and the 
state. 
Efficiency, productivity and economy. 
Before proceeding any further, it may be helpful to consider the definition of the 
economic terms used in this article. ‘Efficiency’ is widely used to mean making the most of 
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available resources. However, this lay meaning is too imprecise for economists who draw a 
distinction between productive efficiency and allocative efficiency. Productive efficiency 
refers to the efficient production of any bundle of outputs, whether products or services. It is 
achieved when it is impossible to achieve a given output if there is no alternative way of 
producing that output that will use less resources. ‘Productivity’ is, strictly speaking, the 
measure of ‘productive efficiency’ but is also used to mean the effectiveness of productive 
effort. Allocative efficiency is related to the distribution of resources. In the context of public 
services, allocative efficiency is achieved when it is not possible to make one individual better 
off through the redistribution of resources without making another worse off. ‘Economy’, in 
the sense of ‘making economies’, is not a term recognised by economists because of its 
ambiguity. It might either mean improving productive efficiency or reducing resource inputs 
in a way that causes reduced outputs, or more colloquially ‘cuts’.12 
In the context of health care, productivity will be maximised when the throughput of 
patients through a hospital bed in a period is maximised whilst maintaining clinical outcomes. 
Allocative efficiency will be achieved when the geographical distribution and sizing of 
hospitals is aligned with need for inpatient care as determined by population variables. The 
initiatives discussed in this article were primarily concerned with productive efficiency, or 
productivity. Measuring productive efficiency in health care is highly problematical, for 
reasons that are mostly to do with definition and measurement of outcomes.13 Discussion of 
these technical challenges is beyond the scope of this article but it should be appreciated that 
efficiency measurement was in its infancy in this ‘primeval’ era of health economics.14  
Productivity and the politics of NHS capital investment 
The findings of Guillebaud moved political discourse about the NHS beyond the all-
consuming ‘crisis of expenditure’ that over-shadowed its earliest years.15 Yet the committee’s 
report did little to appease the Treasury, which remained deeply concerned about the prospect 
of ever-rising NHS costs.16  The committee had been asked to make recommendations on 
ways to avoid ‘a rising charge’ on the Exchequer, so Treasury was understandably 
disappointed when the committee reported that ‘we have found no opportunity for making 
recommendations that would either produce new sources of income or reduce in a substantial 
degree the annual cost of the service’.17 The committee had also been asked to make 
recommendations on ‘the efficient use of such Exchequer funds as may be available’, but the 
report included little by way of specific recommendations for greater efficiency. Discussion 
5 
 
was confined to general observations about hospitals producing more outputs of various kinds 
and serving more people.18 This reflected the approach taken by Guillebaud’s analytical team 
from the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, Abel-Smith and Titmuss. Their 
work was focused on the construction of a more meaningful quantification NHS costs than 
that presented by government accounting; and on the identification of cost trends. It made no 
attempt to define efficiency or construct efficiency indices beyond a crude measure of cost per 
head of population.19 Their analysis did, however, demonstrate how capital expenditure could 
reduce hospital running costs. This was brought into the committee report as part of the wider 
discussion about low levels of capital expenditure. On this last matter, the committee was 
unequivocal. Levels of investment were ‘totally inadequate’ and ‘cannot be allowed to 
continue much longer without serious harm to the service’.20 
By the General Election of October 1959, the two main political parties were both 
promising major hospital building programmes.21 However, the findings of Guillebaud did not 
lead inexorably to the emergence of political consensus, as some historical writing suggests.22 
According to Webster, the ‘stringent regime of containment’ of NHS expenditure imposed by 
the Treasury continued regardless of Guillebaud.23 Cutler argues that this parsimony, which 
was at its most extreme in the case of capital expenditure, was determined by political 
considerations. The popularity of the NHS provided sufficient political headroom to permit 
repeated deferral of capital expenditure.24 Other writing offers a simpler explanation, which is 
that continuing resistance to capital investment reflected Treasury conviction that the Ministry 
of Health was making insufficient efforts to secure economies in current NHS spending.25  
Mohan demonstrates how resistance to a new hospital programme was tied to unwillingness to 
accept such expenditure as investment. The Treasury wanted to see capital projects yielding 
savings in current spending and was doubtful that the Ministry knew how to deploy additional 
capital investment to best achieve this end. 26 When a commitment to a substantial increase in 
capital investment was finally secured, in the Hospital Plan of 1962, it was tied to a 
commitment to contain future increases in current spending. Enoch Powell, the Minister 
responsible for the Plan, took an ‘industrial view’ of acute hospitals and expected investment 
in new hospitals to increase the throughput of patients.27 The Ministry was able to persuade 
the Treasury that the productive efficiency to be gained through judicious capital investment 
promised containment in the rate of increase in current spending.28 Powell had accepted a cap 
on the latter before the Plan was published of 2½ per cent above inflation per annum, this 
being the anticipated rate of growth in national product.29 Cutler argues that any charge of 
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‘strategic inconsistency’ between Powell’s commitment to containment of current spending 
and his planning for increased capital expenditure fails to appreciate the extent to which the 
latter was expected to contribute to the former through productivity gains.30 By 1960, the 
prospects of improvements in productive efficiency had become closely linked to the political 
consensus supporting a substantial programme of investment in NHS hospitals. 
Early initiatives by the Ministry of Health 
The Ministry of Health had, since the early 1950s, taken some steps promote productive 
efficiency in the National Health Service. The Chief Medical Officer’s annual report for 1952 
included a chapter on Utilization of Hospital Beds, which argued that, with capital investment 
likely to be constrained for the near future, increased throughput would be essential to meeting 
demand.31 Studies of bed utilization had been funded by two independent charitable 
foundations, the Kings Edward’s Hospital Fund for London and the Nuffield Provincial 
Hospitals Trust, and had also been undertaken by Liverpool RHB.32 The Ministry was able to 
draw on the findings from these studies when issuing a circular on the subject in 1954, which 
urged scrutiny and control of length of stay.33 The two foundations also produced reports on 
reforms to management accounting in hospitals in 1952, at the request of the Minister. In the 
same year the Ministry also received proposals from the Association of Regional Health Board 
Treasurers. These included recommendation for ‘departmental costing’, including calculations 
of cost per patient treated: a crude measure of efficiency. Progress in implementing these 
proposals was slow, because of divergent opinion on technical matters and it was 1958 before 
the ‘main scheme’ of departmental accounting was introduced, beginning with two hundred 
larger hospitals.34 The Ministry’s had established a statistics branch in 1955, although initially 
this employed only a single statistician.35 These initiatives were all directed towards the 
development of analytical capacity. In a more practical vein, the Ministry had also established 
a small ‘Organisation and Methods’ (O&M) Unit on an experimental basis in 1954. O&M had 
originally emerged during the Second World War as a development of the Treasury’s 
‘Investigating Section’. The Select Committee on the Estimates had, in 1946, recommended 
the adoption of O&M by government departments so as ‘to secure maximum efficiency in the 
operation of the government’s executive machinery and, by the application of scientific 
methods to organisation, to achieve economy in cost and labour’. This led to the setting up of 
an O&M unit at the Treasury which then spawned similar units in spending departments, 
including the Ministry of Health in 1956.36 O&M was concerned with organisational design 
and ‘the studying of administrative and clerical procedures and methods, of office 
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mechanisation and equipment, office layouts and working conditions’.37 The Guillebaud 
Committee, whilst encouraging all these efforts as ‘proceeding on the right lines’, recognised 
that they would be of limited value on their own. The committee trusted that ‘all hospital 
authorities and the staffs concerned will continually study the available statistical material to 
see what steps might be taken in hospital departments to improve the efficiency and economy 
of the service’. But it went to say that ‘the statistics themselves do not provide the answers; 
they only point the way for further enquiry and investigation’.38 The active engagement of the 
hospital authorities would also be needed for productivity improvements. 
In 1958, the Ministry changed up a gear, signalling its intention to develop managerial 
expertise in the NHS and enlist external expertise for greater productive efficiency. During a 
debate in the House of Commons to mark the tenth anniversary of the NHS, the Minister of 
Health, Derek Walker-Smith, announced three initiatives. Consideration would be given to the 
setting-up of an advisory body on management efficiency; there would be an expansion of 
O&M; and management consultants would be engaged to undertake hospital efficiency 
studies, at their own expense. These announcements were linked directly to the subject of 
capital investment in hospitals. Walker-Smith began his speech by trumpeting the 
governments’ hospital building programme before sounding a cautionary note. The hospital 
service accounted for more than half of total NHS spending and would continue to ‘loom 
large’ even if community care was improved. Therefore, he argued, ‘it is vital, where so much 
is involved in money and resources that we should strenuously continue to seek the highest 
common factor of efficiency and economy in administration’. 39  The Ministry had drawn up a 
five year plan that included substantially increased levels of capital investment, but this 
encountered Treasury resistance, as previously discussed, and the political climate was far 
from conducive to proposals for increased public expenditure. It was only six months since the 
entire Treasury front-bench team (which included Enoch Powell) had resigned over the 
Cabinet’s decision not to adopt their plan for cutting public expenditure. Walker-Smith was 
engaged in a delicate balancing act. He wanted to promise new and better hospitals to the 
public. Yet at the same time, he did not want to overstep the mark with the Treasury or 
antagonise party colleagues who remained committed to tight control over public expenditure. 
A pledge to improve NHS efficiency was an obvious way of reconciling these conflicting 
pressures and spoke directly to the concerns of the Treasury.  
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Influences from outside government 
Outside government, various individuals and organisations demonstrated an interest in 
NHS productivity. These included some backbench Members of Parliament, as evident in a 
House of Commons debate held in April 1958. Conservative member Ernest Partridge, spoke 
in support of the use of ‘work study’ in the NHS, which he described as ‘the pointer and 
stimulus to efficient management and administration’. This was challenged by Dr Edith 
Summerskill, a founder member of the Socialist Medical Association, who argued that 
hospitals were largely staffed by nurses, who worked long hours for little pay out of a sense of 
vocation. The notion that work study could be used to extract further savings from nursing 
was, in her view, unrealistic. Nor was she much more optimistic about the prospect of 
efficiency savings in other sections of the workforce. This line of argument was systematically 
demolished by Sir Keith Joseph. Joseph’s assiduous interest in social services had contributed 
to his recruitment by the One Nation Group, which sought to develop a forward-looking 
Conservative position on the welfare state.40 Showing an impressive grasp of detail, Joseph 
pointed to the costs of the NHS; the paucity of data on comparative efficiency; and the 
productivity gains made in other sectors, including the building industry to which he was 
personally connected. He could ‘see no reason by the government should not use the same 
techniques for the National Health Service’.  The junior minister, Richard Thompson, gave his 
views on the potential for productivity techniques in the hospital service. Arguing against the 
potential application of work study to many aspects of hospital work, including nursing, he 
conceded that it might profitably be applied on branches of hospital activity ‘analogous to 
industrial activity – laundries, building maintenance, catering and matters of that kind’. 41 
Views that nursing was an unsuitable case for the application of productivity 
techniques adapted from industry were not shared by the leaders of the profession. The Royal 
College of Nursing (RCN) was, at this time, a strong advocate for scientific investigations into 
hospital operations. The historians of the College, writing of the 1950s, comment that ‘work 
studies were very much in vogue and many in the profession saw them as a solution to 
everyday problems’.42 The RCN anticipated that such investigations would yield compelling 
evidence that outdated hospitals caused inefficiencies in nursing work. This, they hoped, 
would strengthen the case for investment in new hospitals and equipment, providing the 
modern working conditions that would allow the profession to rise above the drudgery in 
which it was mired. Earlier in the decade, the RCN had worked with the Nuffield Provincial 
Hospitals Trust (NPHT), to systematically analyse nursing work. The NPHT Nursing Study 
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applied time and motion techniques to nursing work. The study demonstrated that forty per 
cent of nurses’ time was spent on administration and domestic work and that a great deal of 
inefficiency in nursing work arose from poorly laid-out and inadequately equipped hospitals.43   
Nursing leaders’ hopes that such work would lead to a programme of hospital investment 
were not quickly realised. Against this background, the RCN organised a three-day conference 
on ‘Work Study and the Hospital Service’ in November 1957. The aim of the conference was 
to ‘bring to the attention of those in charge of hospital administration the progress made by the 
application of Work Study in industry so that consideration could be given to its application in 
the hospital field’. The most significant recommendation from the conference, and that to 
which Walker-Smith referred in his 1958 announcement, were that ‘an independent central 
body should be set up to act as an advisory body and encourage a climate of opinion for the 
appreciation of work study, to advise on and promote the training of personnel to undertake 
work study in hospitals, to advise on the introduction of pilot schemes, co-ordinate activities 
and disseminate information on the lines of the British Productivity Council’. 44 
The NPHT, together with the King Edward’s Hospital Fund (‘The King’s Fund’), were 
interested in NHS productivity as an aspect of their mission of support to the health service. 
Both charities had been established to provide financial support for the voluntary hospital 
sector before the NHS. Both charities were compelled to fundamentally re-consider their 
missions and their relationship with the state in 1948. The NPFT set out to make ‘a special 
contribution as an independent body, co-operating with government agencies, in the field of 
enquiry and research into practically all aspects of health services’.45 This included the 
establishment of an in-house operational research (OR) unit to undertake work such as the 
Nursing Study and the influential Investigation into the Function and Design of Hospitals.46 
The Trust also made grants to NHS bodies for service innovations and evaluation. The King’s 
Fund was less focused on fostering efficiency, being more pre-occupied in the 1950s with the 
question of how to deploy its substantial grant-making capacity in a way that added greatest 
value to Exchequer funds. Its submissions to the Guillebaud Committee were anodyne, for 
political reasons, despite the strong views held by some of its staff on the inefficiencies of the 
NHS.47 Of the two charities, it was the NPHT that played the more engaged role in the cause 
of productivity during the 1950s, although the Staff College of the King’s Fund came to play 
an important management training role in the 1960s. 
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Backbench MPs, the RCN and charitable organisations thus constituted a loose 
coalition of interest, possessing diverse motivations, speaking and working for the cause of 
NHS productivity in various ways. The RCN had made a connection to the productivity 
movement in industry, as evident at its 1957 conference which was chaired by a management 
consultant and featured speakers from ICI. Joseph also referred to ICI as an example to the 
NHS in his 1958 speech. The announcements by Walker-Smith signalled that the Ministry of 
Health was ready to engage with the productivity movement. 
Institutions and expertise – the productivity movement 
Policy for improved industrial productivity under Labour had spawned various 
institutions between 1945 and 1951. 48 These included the Anglo-American Productivity 
Council (AACP), which was a creature of the US technical assistance programme and served 
as a vehicle for the transfer of American business practices to the UK.49 The British 
Productivity Council (BPC) was established in 1952 as a successor to AACP and given a 
broad remit for stimulating ‘the improvement of productivity in every sector of the national 
economy by every possible means’. It brought together representatives from employers and 
trade unions in a common forum dedicated to this goal. Activities included the dissemination 
of information on productivity techniques through exchange visits, meetings, lectures and 
rallies. As a national organisation, the BPC recognised that it needed a sub-national presence 
to be effective and promoted both Local Productivity Councils and sector specific studies.50  
The NHS advisory body, as envisioned by the RCN and announced by Walker-Smith, 
was thought of as a sector-specific version of the BPC. This positioning was so explicit that 
the Ministry of Health felt obliged to consult the Board of Trade (the sponsoring department 
for BPC) on potential role overlap. The reply is rather condescending, describing BPC as 
‘essentially a propaganda body’ that had been at risk of dissipating its energies by attempting 
to work in too many fields. The potential for overlap was, therefore, judged to be minimal, as 
was the potential for the BPC to contribute much to the NHS.51  The original intention was to 
call the new advisory body the NHS Productivity Council but this title was changed just 
before launch. Instead the National Health Service Advisory Council for Management 
Efficiency, England and Wales, (ACME) was announced on 4 May 1959 by means of a 
parliamentary question from Keith Joseph to the minister. ACME was given the following 
terms of reference:  ‘to advise generally on measures for improving efficiency in the National 
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Health Service in England and Wales’.52 At the minister’s request, the new body was to 
concentrate on the hospital service. 
This renaming before birth reflects how the productivity council model was moderated 
by two NHS institutions as it was imported into this unique organisational field. The first of 
these was the doctrine of clinical autonomy, which curtailed the field within which NHS 
management could legitimately operate. This is discussed in more detail later. The other 
institution was the established model for advisory bodies in the NHS. Great emphasis was 
given to advisory mechanisms in the early structures of the NHS, as a means of 
accommodating and appeasing various interest groups, including critics of the new service. 53 
Such bodies existed not only to mobilise expertise but also to build consensus. The Ministry’s 
approach to deciding the membership of ACME reflects this blending of external and NHS 
institutional models. The official line was that members were appointed on the basis of the 
personal contribution they could bring to the council, not as delegates or representatives.54 The 
reality was rather different, as multiple iterations of a scheme of representation were 
considered as the basis for membership.55 The Confederation of Health Service Employees 
was invited to nominate three trade unionists. Employers were represented by two Regional 
Hospital Board (RHB) members, Sir Edward Thompson and A M Hudson Davies. Inclusion 
of employer and employee representatives was reflective of the productivity council approach, 
although both the RHB members were prominent industrialists and brought personal expertise 
from the world of business. Geo-political considerations also came into play with inclusion of 
a member from Wales seen as obligatory.  Miss M L Young, Matron of Westminster Hospital, 
was nominated by the Royal College of Nursing, who registered their disappointment that she 
was the sole woman appointed to the Council.56. Teaching and research interests were 
represented by the recently-retired Dean of Birmingham medical school, Professor Sir Arthur 
Thomson, and Professor Theodore ‘Teddy’ Chester, Professor of Social Administration at 
Manchester.57 In effect, then, the membership of ACME reflected its mixed parentage, 
showing elements of the productivity council approach - bringing employers and trades unions 
together - and the NHS advisory council approach which was more concerned with 
representation of a wider spectrum of interests. 
The Ministry also looked to the productivity movement for individuals who could 
bring leadership and expertise into the NHS. The first chairman of ACME, Sir Frank Ewart 
Smith FRS (1897-1995), took up this role upon retirement from ICI where he had spent his 
whole career apart from wartime service with the Ministry of Supply.58 In the post-war period, 
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his responsibilities at ICI had included productivity and he introduced the technique of work 
study to the company in 1947. Smith served as Chairman of the British Productivity Council 
in 1955 and was made an honorary member of the Institute of Work Study in 1960, an honour 
reserved for those considered to have made an outstanding contribution in the field of 
scientific management.59  In private meetings and letters to the minister, Smith made his 
central convictions plain: that training of work study staff would be absolutely critical to 
success; that this training should be intensive; and that Treasury O&M could not offer such 
training.60 The Minister’s response reveals that he shared his official’s worries about ‘selling’ 
the idea of work study to the hospital authorities and that he saw the challenge as initially 
being one of ‘persuasion and evangelism’.61 Smith’s passion for work study, rather than the 
more familiar (in government) O&M and the likely cost of training on the scale he envisaged 
worried officials to the extent that they discussed dropping him as Chairman and instead 
appointing Keith Joseph, who was judged to have ‘the gift of handling people’.62 However, 
Walker-Smith was presumably persuaded that Smith’s potential as an evangelist outweighed 
the risks presented by his uncompromising opinions. 
Russell Mackenzie Currie (1902-1967), a former colleague of Smith, was another 
leading light of the productivity movement who took his expertise into the health sector. He 
founded and directed the Central Work Study Unit at ICI, the staff of which grew from thirty 
in 1947 to two thousand under his leadership. The label ‘productivity missionary’ can 
justifiably be applied to Currie, who achieved international recognition for his expertise and 
has been described as ‘a super salesman for method study and work measurement 
techniques’.63 He was the founding president of both the Institute of Work Study and the 
European Work Study Federation and the author of a British Institute of Management textbook 
on work study, which ran to four editions between 1959 and 1977. Currie appeared as a 
frequent speaker at events promoting work study to the health sector. He spoke at the RCN 
conference on ‘Work Study and the Hospital Service’ in 1957.64 ACME organised an open day 
with the same title in October 1959, at which Currie and two colleagues from ICI presented.65  
When seeking to persuade Walker-Smith of the case for introduction of work study to 
the NHS, Frank Ewart Smith suggested that the Minister might consult some other 
‘independent people who have relevant expertise’. These included Keith Joseph, Lord 
McCorquodale (Chairman of the King Edward’s Hospital Fund), David Price MP (a 
Conservative backbencher who had previously worked for ICI) and Sir George Schuster.66  
Schuster (1881 to 1982) was a Liberal politician who played a role in productivity initiatives 
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in the immediate post-war period. He was appointed Chairman of the Working Party on the 
Cotton Industry and of the Panel on Human Factors Affecting Productivity (1947), which 
reported to the Committee on Industrial Productivity.67 This latter role included a seat on the 
Medical Research Council which undertook research on human factors in partnership with the 
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research. Schuster was thus steeped in both 
productivity methods and human relations thinking.68 He later became Chairman of the Oxford 
Regional Hospital Board which, with support from the Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust, 
became a pioneer in the introduction of productivity techniques, a development that took place 
in advance of the Ministry of Health. A series of influential publications on the NHS by the 
Acton Society Trust, a Liberal party-linked think-tank, included a section by Schuster in which 
he argues for the extension of such techniques to the whole NHS.69 Schuster corresponded 
directly with Smith on the activities of the Ministry of Health, which were viewed as 
something of a bureaucratic hindrance by pioneering Oxford. A further link between Smith 
and Oxford was provided by G Watts, Secretary to the Oxford Regional Hospital Board, who 
was a member of ACME.70 
The adoption of the sector-specific productivity council model and the enrolment of 
leaders from industry were strategies for rapidly acquiring credibility and expertise. The model 
of the productivity council developed for industry was, however, moderated by institutions 
particular to the NHS. A similar effect can be seen in the Ministry’s choice of productivity 
techniques. 
ACME and productivity techniques 
In the post-war productivity drive, different approaches and disciplines proliferated. In 
his textbook, Currie writes of ‘productivity science’, encompassing work study, organisation 
and methods, operational research, network analysis, systems analysis, ergonomics, and value 
engineering.71 Tiratsoo and Tomlinson identify production engineering, materials handling, 
quality control, human relations and inter-firm comparisons as being, together with work 
study, the preferred weapons of the American productivity missionaries.72 The Ministry of 
Health focused exclusively on just three of these disciplines: organisation and methods, work 
study, and operational research.  
The adoption by government departments of Organisation and Methods has previously been 
discussed. Commitment to O&M was furthered strengthened by the Plowden Committee’s 
recommendations for the development of ‘management services’ in government departments. 
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Plowden saw these as encompassing statistics, accountancy, operational research and O&M. 
Health was singled-out as a sector where the development of management services would be 
especially beneficial.73 The central O&M Unit, located at the Ministry, was made permanent 
and given a bigger staff after 1958. From 1959 onwards, the hospital authorities were also 
permitted to employ O&M specialists.74 By 1961 there were fifty-five NHS O&M studies 
underway, of which twenty had been commissioned by the hospital authorities.75 Growth in 
the volume of studies came from the hospital service after 1961, rather than through the 
central unit. By 1963, the number of studies of had risen to seven hundred and fifty.76 By 
1964, around two hundred trained personnel were employed across both the central unit and 
the hospital service.77  
ACME supported the growth of O&M but the council’s primary focus was on the 
introduction of work study to the NHS. Work study combined study of how a particular job 
could be undertaken most efficiently (method study) with the application of techniques 
designed to establish the time for a qualified worker to carry out a specified job at a defined 
level of performance (work measurement).78 In practice, this might mean classic scientific 
management procedures such as time and motion studies using motion-capture cameras. The 
persistence of such techniques may appear surprising, given the scepticism about scientific 
management associated with the ascendant human relations school of management.79 
However, it has been argued that work study was ‘a very pale imitation of Tayloristic 
practices’, tending towards ergonomics and with little influence over standard setting and pay 
bargaining.80 Currie sets out the British contribution to ‘modern work study’, distinguishing it 
from more red-blooded American approaches by emphasising its consensual nature; its 
extension to non-repetitive tasks; and its application in office and clerical settings.81 Insistence 
that the British version of these techniques was somehow exceptional can be seen as a 
reflection of processes of the deflection and dilution of American-inspired techniques, in 
which employers were as influential as organised labour.82 
The third discipline embraced by the Ministry, Operational Research (OR), had its 
provenance in military science. During the Second World War, all three of the armed services 
established OR sections, which were perceived as having made a significant contribution to 
allied victory. OR acquired a particular mystique as a consequence and was seen as offering 
great potential for attacking complex service delivery problems in civil domains, including 
health. Schuster, for example, argued that ‘if some of the groups of scientists who did such 
valuable work in the war…could apply their minds to some of the problems of the Hospital 
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Service, they could provide further ideas for achieving the maximum results with the 
minimum expenditure of money.’83 
OR became influential in health later than either work study or O&M. This was because the 
discipline remained military until the late 1950s, when it began to diffuse out into the civil 
domain.84  The Ministry of Health showed an early interest in the potential of OR, but its 
attempts to get to grips with the discipline were not helped by its fissile practitioner 
community. When officials asked the Operational Research Society (ORS) for a definition in 
1959 they received a response offering a choice of no less than nineteen, reflecting the 
diversity of views within the Society at that time. 85 It was the mid-1960s before the field had 
stabilised sufficiently for the ORS to agree an official definition, which captures the 
discipline’s orientation towards mathematical modelling and its focus on complex problems in 
large scale systems.86  
In summary, the choice of productivity disciplines adopted by the Ministry of Health was 
influenced not just by the productivity movement but also by the existing commitment to 
O&M in government, and the slightly later enthusiasm for OR in civil government. 
The advisory council – developing and mobilizing expertise. 
Having identified its preferred disciplines, the Ministry was faced with the challenge of 
developing and mobilising expertise. This was a core task for ACME, but The Advisory 
Council understood from the outset that it was without executive authority. Instead it would 
‘seek by education, by persuasion and by training, to stimulate initiative and a progressive 
attitude of mind in the field of management efficiency on the part of everyone concerned’.87 
RHB Chairmen concurred, being ‘generally of the opinion that the council’s main task initially 
was the education of the hospital service to the value of efficiency techniques’.88 Ministry of 
health officials had worried prior to the announcement of an advisory council on efficiency 
that it was ‘by no means clear that the hospital authorities would welcome such intervention or 
accept it’.89 In the event, the hospital service was highly receptive, if judged by the response to 
distribution of the statement of aims. This was overwhelmingly positive, confounding 
Ministry officials’ worries about the difficulty of ‘selling’ work study. For example, the Chief 
Administrative Officer of United Sheffield Hospitals wrote asking for three hundred copies of 
the statement to send to every board member, consultant, matron, head of department and 
senior administrator. The ministry was caught-out by the level of interest and there was a 
delay in distribution pending an extra printing run.90 
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The goal of the Council was that, over time, the NHS would become largely self-
sufficient in O&M and work study staff and that these disciplines would become an integral 
part of the hospital service.91 The Advisory Council wanted to ensure that expertise in 
productivity techniques, and learning from local initiatives, would be diffused throughout the 
NHS. It also believed that NHS administrators were unusually insular and suffered from 
‘managerial inbreeding’.92 The answer was an ‘experimental circuit scheme’ to encourage 
rotation of administrators between hospitals, an idea lifted directly from Local Productivity 
Councils.93 The NHS scheme was launched in 1961 and reported to be a great success in its 
pilot phase.94 However, the Advisory Council soon found itself perplexed as to how to 
encourage wider take-up, given its lack of executive authority.95   
Training of work study specialists was on a particular concern of Frank Ewart Smith, 
as he made plain even before his appointment, and was on the agenda for the first meeting of 
the Council. The proposal was that training should be delivered through the King Edward’s 
Hospital Fund Administrative College.96  Established in 1951, the college was by this time 
offering a range of courses in fields such as engineering and catering.97 In August 1960, the 
Ministry announced the launch of training for O&M/Work Study Officers and an Introduction 
to Work Study course for hospital administrators through the King’s Fund College. Leadership 
was provided by Mr P. J. Torrie, another former colleague of Smith, who transferred to the 
College from his position as Head of the Training Section of the ICI Central Work Study 
Unit.98  
ACME’s commitment to the development of expertise within the NHS workforce was 
unhelpful to the management consultancy firms whose aspiration to enter the emerging NHS 
productivity market had been demonstrated by the offer of pro bono hospital studies in 1958. 
Following the completion of these studies the Management Consultants’ Association 
submitted a report to the Ministry of Health in which it claimed that the extension of work 
study throughout the hospital service would save £10 million per annum in the cost of porters, 
ward orderlies, domestics, maintenance and nursing staff. Feedback from the hospital boards 
involved was mixed.99 The view of the Advisory Council was that suitably-trained hospital 
staff should be employed in efficiency studies wherever possible provided they could 
eventually return to their normal duties.100 Management consultants should be used only on an 
exceptional basis where there was a short term deficit in capacity. This approach would ensure 
that those who undertook efficiency studies were also, wherever possible, responsible for 
implementation of efficiency measures and that expertise was retained within the NHS. The 
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ministry issued guidance to hospital authorities setting out the specific circumstances in which 
management consultants might be employed. This included a requirement for ministerial 
approval and capped at six the number of contracts that would be approved for the whole of 
England and Wales in 1961/2.101 Walker-Smith’s announcement did not, therefore, lead to 
widespread use of management consultants in the NHS, and this was due in some measure to 
the influence of ACME. 
Commissioning operational research 
In early 1961, Treasury staff undertook an inspection of staffing in the two Hospital 
Services (HS) divisions of the Ministry. The conclusion reached was that ‘the two divisions 
are not fully equipped to tackle effectively the probable increase in the load of work expected 
to arise from the hospital building programme and the need to take action to promote 
efficiency and economy in the running of hospitals’.102 This led to the creation of a new 
division, within which a branch (HS3-D) was given responsibility for ‘sponsoring and co-
ordinating of experiments and operational research’ and ‘collation of information regarding 
good practice’. HS3-D was also allocated responsibility for ACME, which up to this point had 
lacked any executive support.103  
ACME endorsed calls by Guillebaud for the Ministry to provide funds for OR.104 
However, it envisaged such research being undertaken by the staff of the NHS, not by external 
contractors. Contrary to this view, HS3-D began commissioning what it called ‘operational 
research’ (the term was broadly interpreted) from 1964 onwards, looking mainly to the 
universities and independent research organisations as providers. The first beneficiary of this 
new research funding stream was Professor Teddy Chester.105 Another early contractor was 
Reginald Revans of the University of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology. Revans 
had been a regular correspondent of Ewart Smith, sending him a stream of reports on hospital 
management between 1961 and 1963.106 Initial research commissions were not, in fact, for 
efficiency studies as such but were directed towards better understanding of NHS management 
practice. Research commissioning activity grew rapidly throughout the 1960s.107 Our ability to 
assess how far HS3-D was, in reality, steered by ACME is hampered by the fact that no files 
relating to ACME after 1963 appear to have survived.  
ACME members were always aware of their limitations as a purely advisory body and 
the emergence of executive capacity made ACME appear increasingly superfluous over time. 
When the Advisory Council decided to reconstitute itself and meet less frequently in 1963 the 
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rationale was that the Ministry now had more executive capacity through ‘the valuable 
facilities provided by the new branch (HS3-D)’.108 This was also the point at which Smith 
resigned, handing over the chair of ACME to Hudson Davies. 
Limits to management efficiency  
The activities of ACME, the growth of O&M and the commissioning of research into 
management practice all confirm that management was seen as the primary source of expertise 
for improved efficiency. ACME, in particular, was keen to see such expertise embedded 
within the NHS, rather than relying on external analysis and advice. However, there were two 
limitations upon the scope of management activity that constrained management action: the 
doctrine of clinical autonomy and the lack of linkage between efficiency improvements and 
financial incentives. 
In the lead-up to the 1946 NHS Act, the prospect of restrictions to professional 
autonomy had been one of the principle arguments of the British Medical Association against 
the proposed nationalisation of healthcare.109  To appease these anxieties, the government gave 
a commitment to the protection of clinical autonomy. This concept acquired totemic power, 
even though doctors themselves subsequently struggled to explain exactly what it meant in 
practice.110 Harrison argues that there was little challenge to the doctrine between 1948 and 
1982 and that it co-existed with a commitment to improved efficiency. Policy statements were 
careful never to imply that doctors themselves needed to become more efficient whilst at the 
same time arguing that efficiency in administration would free up more resources for medical 
care.111  
The record of ACME conforms to this analysis. Council Members agreed from the 
outset that the main impact of efficiency initiatives would fall on ancillary staff.112 
Furthermore, ‘there could be no question of forcing the techniques of work study on doctors 
and nurses’. Rather the ‘help and co-operation’ of clinical professionals would be sought in 
relation to ‘the general management of cases, for example the problems of bed occupancy and 
clinic organisation’.113 A disinclination to investigate professional practice is also evident in 
the statement of aims. 
Our aim is the improvement of the general organisation of hospital work and of 
the supporting facilities in order to back up the progress expected on the 
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clinical side, but the professional aspects of clinical practice will not be the 
main concern of the Council.  
One of the great enthusiasms of the national productivity movement was standardisation, 
which was one of the ‘3Ss’ advocated by the American productivity missionaries 
(standardisation, simplification and specialisation).114 ACME applied this principle to hospital 
building and design. Members of committee C, which led on this strand of work, were 
concerned to learn that each region was developing new hospital designs in isolation. The 
regional hospital boards were resistant to the idea of national design standardisation so the 
committee promoted the less-threatening concept of ‘repetitive building units’ and was 
strongly supportive of the Ministry issuing central guidance on best practice.115 Such zeal for 
standardisation was lacking when it came to clinical practice. For example, the sales manager 
of Glass Containers (Medical) Ltd. wrote to the Secretary to the Council to point out the 
productivity gains available through national adoption of his company’s patented ampoule. He 
received the reply that ‘not only would the Minister feel unable…to try to influence a doctor in 
his selection of medical supplies but the Advisory Council for Management Efficiency have 
recognised that the professional aspects of clinical practice are not their main concern. 116 
Work on statistical and financial comparisons involved confronting variations in clinical 
practice, which was a subject of concern to a minority of members from the outset. The 
Secretary of United Bristol Hospitals, Merrivale, argued at the first meeting that the 
implications of such variations for efficiency should be considered and submitted a 
memorandum on this matter in September 1959. he was thanked or a stimulating document but 
the minutes conclude that ‘to compare averages in relation to the work of medical staff was 
difficult and could be dangerous; the aim should be the encouragement of the energetic rather 
than the development of “average” work’.117 
Committee B, which led on financial and statistical comparisons, found itself drawn 
most closely into questions of clinical practice and its bearing on hospital efficiency. It 
examined the issues affecting bed occupancy. In its first report to the whole Council, the 
committee comments on the difficulty of getting any grip on variations in medical practice 
when nobody had authority over the work of medical consultants. The report refers to the 1954 
circular on bed management but goes on to question the adequacy of local measures to ensure 
that hospital doctors were familiar with and followed its recommendations. The conclusion 
reached is that this is essentially an issue that can only be addressed by doctors who needed ‘to 
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play their part not only as doctors, but also as managers of an organisation for more complex 
than most industrial plants’.118 The public pronouncements of ACME as a whole observed 
established boundaries until 1966, when the Advisory Committee (as it became in 1963) 
published a pamphlet on Management Functions of Hospital Doctors.119 This argued that 
clinical decisions are also management decisions and recommended that doctors should be 
given management training. The same arguments were developed further in a publication on 
hospital efficiency by the Office of Health Economics in the following year.120 
The second constraint over management action was resistance to creating any link 
between efficiency improvements and financial rewards in the NHS. From the outset, the 
Trade Union representatives on ACME pressed for discussion as to how savings from 
productivity improvements could be returned in part to their members. Smith was adamant 
that such matters were beyond the remit of the Advisory Council, as were related matters such 
as the handling of potential redundancies. 121 Weaker incentives, in the form of rewards for 
efficiency suggestions, were considered but many difficulties were foreseen and the Council 
recommended that the hospital authorities ‘should proceed slowly’.122 The second report of 
ACME includes a cautious discussion of financial incentives but the potential sensitivity of the 
issue is indicated by a covering note to the minister (by now Enoch Powell) which suggests 
that the relevant paragraphs might be omitted should the document be circulated throughout 
the hospital service.123 A brief - and anodyne - guidance note on efficiency studies, dealing 
mostly with the handling of labour relations, was issued by the Ministry of Health in March 
1960, promising full consultation and the avoidance of compulsory redundancies.124  
Concluding discussion  
The material presented in this article demonstrates how techniques created for 
industrial productivity were adopted in at least one part of the public social services. Caution 
is needed in making any generalisations about the implications for the public sector more 
widely. In the case of health, this migration was prompted by factors that may have been 
exceptional: political exigencies; the influence of non-government actors; and the enthusiasm 
of a small number of ‘productivity missionaries’ who were prepared to make a personal 
commitment to the sector. The operation of productivity policy in the NHS was blunted by the 
constraints of clinical autonomy and de-coupled from financial incentives. The consensual and 
corporatist approach evident in the industrial sector was made even more consensual and 
corporatist in the NHS by the overlay of the advisory council model. The scope for ACME to 
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make an impact was severely constrained by its purely advisory role. When the Ministry did 
develop executive capacity, this devoted its energies and resources to activities that met with 
Treasury approval: the growth of O&M capacity, which was familiar in government, and the 
commissioning of operational research. Further comparative investigations would be needed to 
establish whether Health was exceptional, both in its receptivity and in the extent to which it 
adapted external approaches to fit in with its own institutions. 
The material presented in this essay also offers a new perspective on the history of 
management in the NHS. The conventional view is that hospital administrators only adopted 
quantitative techniques in the late 1960’s as part of a long march towards management and 
leadership. 125 The evidence presented here locates the adoption of industrial management 
techniques as occurring much earlier. Analysis in this vein invites a reading-back of later 
paradigms of management into the 1950s, which in turn risks becoming a search for ever-
earlier progenitors of modern management practice. Apart from the presentism involved, this 
would be too simplistic. As both Guillebaud and ACME observed, the ability to analyse 
variation in performance does not, in itself, amount to the possibility of action to improve 
performance. The primary obstacle to managerial intervention for improved patient care was 
the doctrine of clinical autonomy, which created a barrier between initiatives in the supporting 
organisation for clinical practice and clinical practice itself. The logical conclusion was that 
doctors, as the senior clinical profession, had to become more managerial. It seems likely, 
then, that the experience gained through early productivity initiatives was influential in two 
later medically-led movements: medical management and clinical effectiveness.  
Two points in relation to actors outside government emerge from the material 
presented above. First, the actors involved were diverse in their motivation and the nature of 
their engagement with the NHS. The RCN was a professional body motivated by concerns for 
the working conditions of its members. Conservative backbenchers were motivated by a 
conviction that the social services could and should become more efficient by learning from 
industry. The interest of the two charitable foundations concerned arose from their re-
interpreted mission of support for health care. The involvement of the productivity 
missionaries was another kind of voluntarism, born of professional commitment to a particular 
view of management technique. The diversity of interests, and their importance in prompting 
and animating government in this period, all speaks to Finlayson’s caution about laying too 
much emphasis on the state in explaining the development of welfare, including social 
services. The history of NHS productivity provides a case study in a ‘mixed economy’ in 
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which state, voluntary, commercial and informal sectors were blended in variable proportions. 
Second, while it is undoubtedly the case that the state did develop its capacity for intervention 
throughout this period, this was not so much accompanied by a withering away of the 
voluntary sector as a re-positioning. So, for example, the closure of the OR group at NPFT in 
the early 1960’s might be seen as a classic case of a charity vacating the field as the apparatus 
of the state developed. However, a closer reading suggests an alternative explanation. NPHT 
moved towards a model of grant-making to universities because it recognised that the 
quinquennial review system of the University Grants Council created strong pressures for 
continuation of funding once a research group was established.126 It also made grants to the 
hospital authorities, often on a match-funding basis, to stimulate the development of 
investigative appetite and capacity. This could, equally well, be interpreted as not so much 
retreat as change of tack, flexibly engaging with new state mechanisms in a way that would 
maximise the returns from the charity’s limited funds. The returns sought were the 
development of knowledge and expertise of relevance to the health service. The King’s Fund 
Division of Hospital Services was developed during the 1960s and undertook a series of 
practical investigations that were highly relevant to the building of new hospitals.127 These 
observations speak to Prochaska’s theme that the voluntary sector is constantly re-inventing 
itself and finding new ways of supplementing the state.128 
What can be said about the success or otherwise of these early initiatives for NHS 
productive efficiency? Not very much. Over this period, little progress was made in 
developing efficiency indices so that the Office of Health Economics report on Hospital 
Efficiency, published in 1967, can only look at very crude indicators, such trends in as the 
number of beds per thousand of population. The report devotes considerable attention to the 
existence of variations in such indicators, but is unable to explain these at a point in time, let 
alone offer any analysis of efficiency trends. The Hospital Plan did not secure savings in 
current costs on the scale anticipated.129 The historical verdict on specific initiatives has not 
been positive, with ACME described as ‘lacking in decisive leadership’ and as adopting ‘a 
guarded approach, rather than a more interventionist one’.130 Such judgements are perhaps too 
instrumental. ACME was an advisory, not an executive, body. As with all the initiatives 
discussed, it possessed significant ideological, participatory and symbolic properties and may 
have mattered most in conferring credibility to statements that the NHS was firmly committed 
to becoming more efficient through the adoption of advanced management techniques. 
Acceptance that this was so was pivotal in securing acceptance of the NHS Plan. 
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